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Chapter 11 
 
Social Capital, Growth, and Poverty:  
A Survey of Cross-Country Evidence  
 
Stephen Knack 
 
This chapter surveys the major contributions to the rapidly growing empirical literature 
on social capital and economic performance, focusing primarily on cross-country 
approaches. It first addresses characteristics of governments that fall under broad 
definitions of the term social capital. It then reviews studies of ―civil,‖ or 
nongovernmental, social capital.  
 
 Most of this literature explores the determinants of growth in per capita income, 
devoting no attention to distributional effects. This chapter is a preliminary attempt to fill 
that gap by providing new cross-country evidence on the effects of social capital on 
poverty and the distribution of income.  
 
 This chapter is limited primarily to cross-country studies of social capital and 
economic performance. It does not attempt to  comprehensively review regional-, village-
, or individual-level analysis or the expanding literature on social capital’s impact on 
noneconomic outcomes, such as health, education, or crime. Nor does it examine the 
rapidly growing body of work that explores the determinants of social capital.  
 
Defining Social Capital  
The breadth of the term social capital varies from one researcher to another. In keeping 
with the scope of the World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative, the term is defined broadly 
here to include features of both government and civil society that facilitate collective 
action for the mutual benefit of a group, where a group may be as small as a household or 
as large as a country.  
 
 Collier (1998a) distinguishes between government social capital and civil social 
capital. Adopting his terminology (if not his precise definitions), I use government social 
capital to refer to government institutions that influence people’s ability to cooperate for 
mutual benefit. The most commonly analyzed of these institutions in the literature 
reviewed here include the enforceability of contracts, the rule of law, and the extent of 
civil liberties permitted by the state. Civil social capital encompasses common values, 
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norms, informal networks, and associational memberships that affect the ability of 
individuals to work together to achieve common goals.  
 
 What unifies the two concepts is that both types of social capital help solve the 
problem of social order by overcoming collective action problems. Social norms and 
generalized trust are analogous to legally enforced property and contract rights: they 
reduce uncertainty and transactions costs, enhancing the efficiency of exchange, 
encouraging specialization, and promoting investment in ideas, human capital, and 
physical capital.  
 
  A theme repeatedly emerging from cross-country empirical studies is that 
development is largely a function of incentives faced by wealth-maximizing individuals. 
In some countries, the structure of incentives steers people primarily toward producing 
new wealth; in other countries it is easier to obtain wealth by diverting it from others. 
Social capital determines the relative payoffs associated with production (―making‖) and 
predation (―taking‖). Where social and legal mechanisms for the efficient resolution of 
prisoners’ dilemma and principal-agent games are weak or absent, the private returns to 
predation increase while the private returns to production fall.  
 
Cooperation at What Level, or Which Groups Benefit?  
In studying the relation between social capital and economic well-being, the choice of 
units of analysis is crucial. Fundamentally, the social capital question concerns the 
benefits and costs of cooperation. Within-group collective action often imposes costs on 
nonmembers. Thus scholars have gradually recognized the potential importance of 
negative as well as positive effects of social capital. Cooperation within a group will 
often have multiple effects. Welfare within the group generally will be enhanced, in the 
sense that the collective gains net of costs to group members is positive—this is the 
standard hypothesis concerning social capital’s impact. However, the welfare of 
nonmembers may also be affected—and not always for the better.  
 
 When the goal of one group is to reduce the well-being of members of some other 
group, we can hypothesize that successful collective action in the first group will entail 
welfare losses for members of the second group (gains by the Nazi Party in Germany in 
the 1930s, for example, came at the expense of European Jews). More often, a group may 
not directly value a reduction in the welfare of nonmembers, but it may nonetheless be 
willing to impose costs on nonmembers in pursuit of its own goals. Sugar producers in 
the United States, for example, are not interested in reducing the welfare of sugar 
consumers, but they are willing to lobby for import quotas that increase their profits at 
consumers’ expense. The implication is that in general we can predict only that 
cooperation by members of a group will improve the welfare of a group’s own members; 
the effect on other groups or on the village, ethnic group, or country as a whole is 
ambiguous. If, for example, the members of each household in a village cooperate in the 
interests of the household, the village as a whole may be worse off than a neighboring 
village in which individuals are less willing or able to impose costs on people outside the 
household.  
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 To see how cooperation can reduce aggregate social welfare, suppose that social 
ties within a village raise the rate of return to a public project, making all village residents 
better off. If these same social ties are responsible for the village’s success in lobbying 
for outside funds to finance the project, a second village with weaker social ties that loses 
out in the competition for funds is made worse off. If the funds would have been more 
productively spent in the second village (because it was poorer, for example), the first 
village’s high level of social capital can actually reduce social welfare at the aggregate 
level.  
 
 Strong ethnic ties can improve the welfare of members of an ethnic group, but 
they often do so at the expense of other groups.
1
 Depending on how encompassing a 
group is, the costs it is willing to impose on nonmembers in the pursuit of its members’ 
interests may be a large multiple of the group’s gains from collective action (Olson 
1982). A group’s ability to impose costs on nonmembers is likely to vary with a society’s 
governance structures. Where the populace has secure civil liberties, and property rights 
and the rule of law are strong, fewer social resources are up for political grabs and groups 
have less opportunity to benefit from zero-sum or negative-sum competition against other 
groups (Rodrik 1999; Lane and Tornell 1996).  
 
  Identifying Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) – with some exaggeration -- as either 
end of a continuum of views about the effects of groups, the Olson perspective suggests 
that  social capital within one group generally has negative effects on other groups and on 
the country as a whole. The Putnam perspective holds that social capital by one group has 
positive effects on all groups, because cooperation among members of a group creates 
habits and attitudes toward serving the greater good that carry over to members’ 
interactions with nonmembers. Which effect dominates is an empirical question that is 
likely to depend on both cultural and institutional factors (religions, for example, may 
differ in their emphasis on the desirability of behaving altruistically toward strangers.)  
 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Grootaert (1999), and others have begun testing hypotheses 
about the effect of household- and village-level social capital. Varshney (1998) and 
others are investigating the impact of interethnic and intraethnic ties on the frequency and 
intensity of ethnic conflict. This chapter reviews evidence from studies in which country-
level indicators of well-being are the dependent variables. Most of this evidence bears 
specifically on the hypothesis that an increase in cooperation within a country as a whole 
improves national well-being. Most of the evidence provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that social capital as measured at the national level is associated with 
improved economic welfare of societies, as measured by growth, investment, and poverty 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
1
Iintraethnic collective action against another ethnic group (such as the violence by the 
Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims) generally strengthens ties within the 
victimized group, making the net impact of collective action on the welfare of members 
of the first group ambiguous.  
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Social Capital, Investment, and Growth: A Survey of the Empirical 
Literature 
Indicators of governmental social capital are almost always measured at the national 
level. Values for the rule of law, for example, are assigned to countries, not to constituent 
parts of countries, such as provinces, villages, or households, In part, this is a question of 
data availability; one could conceivably attempt to measure differences in local laws or 
differences in the ways in which local governments enforce national laws regarding, say, 
the enforceability of contracts. However, within-country variation in government social 
capital is likely to be very small relative to cross-country variation, particularly since 
governments are highly centralized in most of the world.
2
    
 
 Measuring civil social capital is more problematic. While the judicial system in 
most countries is likely to enforce contracts more or less equally well across all regions, 
cooperative norms, interpersonal trust, and the social ties that generate them are more 
likely to vary by locality. Because they will vary more than government social capital, 
they are more likely to play a role in explaining regional differences in economic 
performance within countries. Measuring regional differences within countries—through 
surveys or other means—is costly, however, and is not likely to be undertaken in a 
comparable fashion for a large sample of countries any time soon.  
 
 Cooperative norms, trust, and social ties are usually measured by conducting 
representative surveys of individuals. Important issues arise in aggregating survey-based 
measures to assign values to countries. A country populated by individuals with strong 
intrafamily or intraethnic trust or ties, for example, is not what Fukuyama (1995) and 
others mean by a ―high-trust society.‖  
 
 Conceptually, the type of trust that should be unambiguously beneficial to a 
country’s economic performance is trust between strangers—or more precisely, between 
two randomly matched residents of a country. Particularly in large and mobile societies, 
where personal knowledge and reputation effects are limited, a sizable proportion of 
potentially mutually beneficial transactions will involve parties with no prior personal 
ties. In societies in which strangers can trust one another to act in the collective interest, 
not only can people leave their bicycles unattended and unlocked on the street, they can 
contract with a wide range of parties without drafting lengthy written agreements and run 
businesses without devoting a lot of time to monitoring employees, partners, and 
suppliers. They may also be more likely than members of low-trust societies to support 
efficient economic policies, whether or not they increase one’s personal income.   
 
 It is something like trust in strangers—or the propensity to cooperate in large-
numbers prisoners’ dilemma settings (whether such trust is created by social or 
government mechanisms or some combination of the two)—that we must measure to test 
the hypothesis that social capital at the national level is associated with improved national 
                                                 
2
Of course, legal systems often protect the rights of some citizens more effectively than 
others, based on gender or ethnicity, for example.  
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economic welfare. Within-family trust, intraethnic trust, or other forms of particularized 
or specific trust may be corrosive to generalized trust (trust in strangers). Strong 
intraethnic trust in an ethnically heterogeneous society may restrict the scope for 
transacting and lead to segmented markets, reducing gains from specialization and 
perhaps from economies of scale (Greif 1994). Because of the importance of these and 
other measurement issues, the question of measurement is a recurring theme in the 
empirical literature on social capital and economic performance.  
 
 
Government Social Capital 
Researchers measure government social capital in a variety of ways. Some look at civil 
liberties and political freedom. Others measure the frequency of political violence or 
study subjective ratings of political risk. This section examines these and other ways of 
measuring government social capital. 
 
Civil Liberties and Political Freedoms 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) appear to have been the first to explore the relation 
between government social capital and economic performance using a cross-country 
statistical approach. Their study is based on International Financial Statistics data on the 
average annual growth in per capita income and the investment to GDP ratio for a sample 
of 47 countries between 1950 and 1977. In regressions with growth and investment as the 
dependent variables, they test hypotheses on income convergence, population growth, 
government size, trade openness, and inflation and examine the relation between 
economic performance and ―civil liberties.‖  ―Civil liberties‖ is an index constructed by 
Raymond Gastil (1990) for Freedom House (see annex). Values range from 1 to 7, with 
lower scores indicating greater civil liberties. Gastil’s criteria are primarily political and 
social rather than economic Kormendi and Meguire were interested in also testing the 
impact of ―economic rights, such as freedom from expropriation or the enforceability of 
property rights and private contracts‖ (p. 154). They acknowledge that the civil liberties 
index was not intended to measure economic rights but argue that the two are likely 
correlated.  
 
 Kormendi and Meguire dichotomize the Gastil index, classifying countries with 
scores of 1 and 2 as high civil liberty countries. This dummy variable has a positive and 
marginally significant impact in their growth regression. Growth rates in the high civil 
liberties countries average about 1 percentage point higher than in other countries, 
controlling for income convergence, population growth, government size, trade openness, 
and inflation. They find evidence that the association between civil liberties and growth is 
attributable almost entirely to the effect of civil liberties on investment rates: when the 
investment to GDP ratio is added to the growth regression, civil liberties no longer has 
any independent effect. In a regression with the investment to GDP ratio as the dependent 
variable, civil liberties is by far the most powerful explanatory factor. High civil liberties 
is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in investment's share of GDP (which 
averages about 20 percent).  
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 The Kormendi and Meguire study is limited to 47 countries for which data were 
available beginning in 1950. Grier and Tullock (1989) explore the relation between a 
similar set of independent variables and growth with a much larger sample (113 
countries). Each observation in their analysis covers a five-year period, so that six 
observations are available for a country for which data are available from 1950 to 1980 
and four observations are available for countries for which data are available only since 
1960.. 
 
 Using an F-test, Grier and Tullock reject the null hypothesis that it is appropriate 
to pool observations from different continents and run separate regressions for OECD, 
Latin American, African, and Asian countries. They construct a dichotomous variable 
from Gastil's civil liberties indicator in which countries in the two most repressive 
categories are distinguished from all others, creating what they call ―a proxy for the 
political infrastructure.‖ They find that political repression is associated with a significant 
reduction in annual growth rates of about 1.5 percentage points in Latin America and 
Africa but that repression has no effect in Asia (no OECD country was classified as 
repressive).  
 
 The research design employed by Grier and Tullock treats every observation 
within each continent grouping as independent. It includes no country dummies or tests 
or corrections for autocorrelation.
3
 Other studies using pooled time-series cross-country 
data routinely find regression residuals to be strongly correlated within countries. It is 
doubtful that civil liberties would remain statistically significant using a more appropriate 
research design, particularly for the Latin America sample (where the t-statistic for civil 
liberties is only 1.88).  
 
 Scully (1988) uses the civil liberties indicator and other indicators provided by 
Gastil as measures of the "institutional framework." He views Gastil’s criterion of the 
"independence of the judiciary" as a proxy for the rule of law. A separate Gastil indicator 
assigns countries to one of five categories based on their level of "economic freedom," 
which Scully takes as a proxy for the security of private property rights. A third Gastil 
variable rates political freedoms on a seven-point scale.  
 
Scully constructs a series of dummy variables from these three measures and tests 
their effects on income growth over the 1960–80 period for a sample of 115 countries, 
controlling for changes in the capital-labor ratio. He finds that income growth in 
countries with greater civil liberties (or political or economic freedom) is about twice that 
in countries with less freedom. Because civil, political, and economic freedoms are 
highly correlated, including all three sets of measures in one regression increases these 
growth differences only slightly: countries that rate high on all three indicators enjoy 
growth rates three times that of  countries that receive low ratings on all three dimensions 
(2.73 percent versus 0.91 percent annual growth).  
                                                 
3
Because all observations for a country are assigned the same value (from the late 1970s) 
for the civil liberties index, including country dummies would make it impossible to 
estimate the impact of civil liberties.  
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 Causality is a serious and largely neglected problem in all of these studies. Bilson 
(1982) shows that civil liberties are strongly associated with per capita income (and 
positively but not significantly related to recent income growth), but his interpretation is 
that economic performance determines freedoms rather than the other way around. The 
Gastil ratings were constructed beginning in 1973. Scully uses the average values for the 
1973–80 period in his study of 1960–80 growth. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) analyze 
growth over the 1950–77, Grier and Tullock (1989) over the 1950–80 period, each 
apparently using Gastil’s ratings for 1978 or 1979. A potentially serious limitation of this 
work is that the effect precedes the cause: the key independent variables of the three 
studies represent conditions prevailing in the late 1970s, while the dependent variables 
measure economic performance over extended periods ending in 1980 or before. Using 
Gastil indexes averaged over the years 1974–89 in tests measuring investment and 
growth over that same period, Knack and Keefer (1995) obtain much weaker effects for 
civil and political freedoms.  
 
 Because of the large number and wide variety of criteria used in Gastil’s civil 
liberties index, it is a questionable proxy for narrower concepts, such as the rule of law, 
contract enforceability, or security of property rights. While certain criteria incorporated 
in the index are highly relevant (rights to property, independence of the judiciary, 
freedom from government corruption), others (the presence of free religious institutions, 
free trade unions, and freedom from ―gross socioeconomic inequality‖ and ―gross 
government indifference‖) are not. 
 
 Studies conducted in the 1990s on the relation between type of regime and growth 
interpret Gastil’s political freedoms and civil liberties indexes as measures of democracy. 
Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) find that the Gastil indexes are positively related to 
growth only if variables such as educational attainment and investment rates are omitted 
as explanatory variables. They conclude that any beneficial effect of democracy on 
growth may operate through these factor accumulation channels. Barro finds that a 
curvilinear relation between growth and the Gastil index fits the data better than a linear 
specification, with the fastest rates of growth exhibited by countries that are only partly 
free.
4
 Barro, Helliwell, and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) all conclude that the 
positive relation between income levels and democracy is largely attributable to the effect 
of income on democracy rather than vice versa. These results are consistent with Lipset's 
(1959) interpretation of the correlation between income and democracy. (See Przeworski 
and Limongi 1993 for a critical review of the extensive and inconclusive literature on the 
relation between regime type and economic performance.) 
 
 Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett (1997) analyze the impact of the ―quality of 
governance‖ on the performance of hundreds of projects financed by the World Bank in 
developing countries between 1974 and 1993. They find that rates of return are higher in 
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Studies of the determinants of deaths from political violence found a similar curvilinear 
relation, with deaths highest among countries with intermediate Gastil indexes. See, for 
example, Muller and Weede (1990).  
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countries with greater civil liberties, as measured by the Gastil index and other indicators 
of civil liberties. Controlling for national policy variables, capital-labor ratios, project 
complexity, and regional dummies, each one-point improvement in the seven-point Gastil 
scale is associated with improvement of more than 1 percentage point in the rate of return 
(which averaged about 16 percent over all projects). Gastil’s political freedoms index and 
other indicators of democracy are unrelated to project performance. Civil unrest 
(frequencies of riots, strikes, and protest demonstrations) is positively associated with 
performance—in the authors’ view because civil unrest is indicative of environments in 
which mechanisms for expression of discontent with government performance are 
available and effective. The authors interpret their findings as evidence for the view that 
increasing public voice and accountability improves government performance.
5
  
 
Frequency of Political Violence  
 
Barro’s (1991) classic empirical study on the determinants of growth tests indicators of 
political instability, which he interprets as adverse influences on property rights. These 
instability variables have important advantages over the Gastil indexes as proxies for 
property rights and other dimensions of the quality of governance. First, they are 
objective measures, consisting of the number of incidents of various types of political 
violence. Second, they are constructed for the entire period covered by the Summers-
Heston (1991) income data set, not just for recent years, allowing for a fuller empirical 
treatment of causality issues.  
 
 The two violence measures Barro tests are the average annual number of 
revolutions (or coups) and of political assassinations, using data from Banks (1993). He 
finds that each of these variables is significantly and negatively related to growth rates 
and to private investment’s share of GDP between 1960 and 1985.6 Barro reports that 
once these variables are included, Gastil’s indexes (which he tested in earlier unpublished 
drafts) are no longer significant.  
 
Endogeneity is a potentially serious problem with violence indicators: Barro 
acknowledges that the relation between violence and growth might reflect the positive 
effect of growth on political stability rather than the other way around. Investigations of 
this issue using time-series data provide mixed results. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and 
Easterly (1996) show that political instability and violence are jointly determined: coups 
lead to worse economic performance, but slow growth increases the likelihood of coups. 
Londregan and Poole (1990, 1992) also conclude that coups are caused by low growth, 
but they find that more frequent coups do not reduce growth rates. Using income 
inequality as an instrument for political instability and the price of investment goods as 
an instrument for investment, Alesina and Perotti (1996) find that instability lowers 
                                                 
5
By this interpretation of the Gastil civil liberties indicator, it could represent civil rather 
than government social capital.   
6
Indexes of political instability constructed from several violence indicators have been 
linked to growth (Gupta 1990) and to investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996).  
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investment’s share of GDP but that investment rates do not significantly affect political 
violence.   
 
 As with the Gastil measures, it is questionable how well the frequency of political 
violence captures variations in the underlying country characteristics of interest, such as 
the security of property rights and the rule of law. Coups, for example, often entail only 
changes in the identity of the kleptocratic chief executive, with few or no implications for 
the property rights of anyone outside the ruler’s and ex-ruler’s circles of key supporters. 
Conversely, some stable (long-lasting) governments have been known to legislate 
economic policies erratically through numerous and unpredictable executive decrees.  
 
Subjective Ratings of Political Risk  
The deficiencies of violence counts and the Gastil indexes, coupled with the increasing 
prominence of new institutional explanations for underdevelopment (North 1990), 
created a demand for more direct measures of the quality of governance. In independent 
but simultaneous research, Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) turned to 
subjective ratings marketed to international investors by firms specializing in political 
risk evaluation. These ratings services include the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI), and Business International 
(BI). (For a description of these services, see annex.) 
 
 The ICRG rates the institutional environments of countries on many dimensions. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) construct an index from the five dimensions they view as being 
of greatest relevance to the security of private property and the enforceability of 
contracts: corruption in government, the rule of law, risk of expropriation, repudiation of 
contracts by government, and quality of the bureaucracy. They construct a similar index 
from the following BERI variables: contract enforceability, nationalization risk, 
bureaucratic delays, and infrastructure quality. 
 
 Adding the ICRG index to a Barro-type growth regression, Knack and Keefer find 
that a one standard deviation increase in the index (about 12 points on a 50-point scale) 
increases average growth by 1.2 percentage points. Substituting the BERI index for the 
ICRG index produces a similar association with growth. These indexes (particularly the 
BERI index) prove to have strong explanatory power for private investment as well. 
Moreover, in growth or investment regressions that include the violence counts or Gastil 
indexes as well as the Knack and Keefer property rights indexes, only the Knack and 
Keefer indexes prove statistically significant. Because of its much better cross-country 
coverage relative to the BERI or BI indicators, the ICRG indicators have become widely 
used in the cross-country empirical literature on economic performance.  
 
 In related work, Knack (1996) and Keefer and Knack (1997) show that the rate at 
which poor countries converge to the richest countries’ income levels varies with the 
quality of governance, as proxied by the ICRG and BERI indexes. Keefer and Knack test 
interactions between initial per capita income and institutional quality. They find that the 
ability of poor countries to take advantage of the rapid growth opportunities afforded by 
relative backwardness is a function of property rights and contract enforcement. That is, 
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as predicted by convergence theories, the coefficient on initial income is negative and 
significant only when the values of ICRG and BERI are sufficiently high.   
 
 Mauro (1995) tests three variables constructed from BI indicators: corruption; a 
bureaucratic efficiency index constructed from corruption, bureaucracy and red tape, and 
the quality of the legal system and judiciary; and a political stability index constructed 
from six indicators representing the likelihood of changes in government, terrorist acts, 
labor unrest, other domestic conflict, or conflict with neighboring countries. These 
indexes are positively and significantly related to growth and investment in Barro-type 
regressions. Although the indexes are strongly correlated with one another, the political 
stability and bureaucratic efficiency indexes are each marginally significant when both 
are entered in the same regression. When investment is included in the growth regression, 
the BI coefficients decline somewhat, suggesting that part but not all of the growth 
effects of political stability and bureaucratic efficiency are attributable to efficiency and 
innovation channels. This pattern also emerges when the ICRG index is used. Using the 
BERI index, the institutional environment appears to influence growth primarily through 
investment rates. 
 
 Mauro's BI indicators are averages for the 1980–83 period, while investment and 
growth are measured over the 1960–85 period, raising the issue of causality. Economic 
success may improve bureaucratic efficiency and political stability. Moreover, possible 
biases in coding that are correlated with economic performance are more problematic 
with these indicators than with the Gastil indexes or political violence counts. An expert 
might surmise, for example, that corruption must not be too severe in a particular country 
because it attracts foreign investment or is growing rapidly. 
 
 Mauro deals with the reverse causation issue by using an index of ethnic 
fractionalization and a set of colonial heritage dummies as exogenous instruments for the 
BI indicators. For the most part, his two-stage least-squares estimates of the association 
between the BI indicators and economic performance are positive and significant. 
Although he reports that overidentification tests confirm the validity of the instruments, 
the use of ethnic fractionalization is questionable because of evidence that it influences 
growth independently of its effects on bureaucratic efficiency and political stability. 
Using a variety of ethnicity indicators, Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic 
heterogeneity is associated with a broad range of inefficient economic policy choices. In 
the ICRG sample (which is larger than the BI sample), ethnic fractionalization remains 
significantly related to growth even after controlling for institutional quality (Zak and 
Knack 2001).  
 
 Knack and Keefer (1995) also acknowledge the potential for reverse causality 
from economic performance to (real or perceived) institutional quality. Their response is 
to measure institutions as far back in time as possible and to measure their dependent 
variables farther forward in time. They focus primarily on growth and investment rates 
over the 1974–89 period (using data from Levine and Renelt 1992), using the first 
available observation for each country for their institutional indicators (1982 for ICRG 
and 1972 for BERI for most countries).  
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 Chong and Calderon (2000) employ a more rigorous approach to causality, using 
BERI data (the longer time series for BERI makes it preferable to BI or ICRG data for 
conducting causality tests exploiting time-series variation in the data). They obtain strong 
evidence for two-way causality: growth increases the BERI measures and higher BERI 
values increase growth rates.  
 
 A potentially important drawback of the political risk indicators used by Mauro 
and Knack and Keefer is that these measures likely better represent conditions facing 
foreign investors (the paying clients of risk assessment firms) than conditions confronting 
domestic investors. Given the crucial importance of foreign technology and capital for 
successful catch-up growth in poor countries, conditions facing would-be foreign 
investors are by no means irrelevant. Unless those conditions are perfectly correlated 
across countries with conditions facing domestic investors, however, subjective political 
risk evaluations represent only partial indicators.  
 
Surveys of Entrepreneurs 
A very different approach to measuring property rights, contract enforceability, and 
bureaucratic integrity and efficiency is to survey foreign and domestic entrepreneurs 
operating in developing countries. This approach has been implemented most 
impressively by Borner, Brunetti, and Weder (1995) and in the private sector survey 
conducted for the 1997 World Development Report (see World Bank 1997 and Brunetti, 
Kisunko and Weder 1997). 
 
 Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1997) construct a country-level credibility of rules 
index from the survey data, designed to characterize ―unclear property rights, constant 
policy surprises and policy reversals, uncertain contract enforcement, and high 
corruption.‖ The index is based on country means of survey responses to 10 items 
measuring expectations of the frequency of government changes and policy surprises, 
protection from criminal actions, unpredictability of the judiciary, and the frequency of 
―irregular additional payments‖ necessary to operate a business. Each item has six 
possible responses. The authors treat the responses as interval-scale variables and 
compute averages for each question by country. They then average over all 10 items, 
creating an index ranging from a best possible value of 1 to a worst possible value of 6.  
 
 For their 41-country sample, Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder find their credibility 
of rules index to be significantly related to growth and investment during 1983–94, after 
controlling for initial income and educational attainment. Although they did not report 
the quantitative impact of their index, their regression coefficients imply extremely large 
effects: each one level improvement in the 1–6 credibility scale is associated with a 3.7 
percentage point increase in investment's share of GDP and a 1.5 percentage point 
increase in annual average income growth.  
 
 Because original surveys can be guided by theory, they produce even more direct 
and relevant measures of the quality of governance than those provided by political risk 
evaluators such as the ICRG, BERI, and BI ratings. The questions can also be asked of 
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both domestic and foreign investors. These survey indicators have several major 
limitations, however. First, the studies have been conducted only in a relatively small 
number of countries—far smaller than the number covered by ICRG, for example. 
Second, studies employing these data have not subjected them to adequate reliability 
testing. Confidence in the accuracy of country estimates produced by the data would be 
increased if the researchers were able to report that the average variance of responses 
within countries for any given survey item was small relative to the variance across 
countries. Third, the data are measured end-of-period, as the surveys used in Brunetti, 
Kisunko and Weder (1997) were conducted in 1996. Questions about whether conditions 
were better, worse, or the same 10 years ago are included in the questionnaire, but for 
many obvious reasons such recall measures are a very crude means of tackling causality 
issues.  
Finally, these surveys may not measure current conditions more accurately than 
political risk indicators such as ICRG. The sample is drawn from a censored population, 
which may have a more optimistic view of the investor climate than the true population 
of interest (namely, all potential investors). The entrepreneurs surveyed in each country 
include only those who chose to invest; would-be investors scared away by poor 
governance or other factors are not represented in the sample. The degree of censoring 
will increase with poor governance, as a larger proportion of potential investors will 
decline to invest. Cross-country variation would also be reduced if only the most 
dissatisfied entrepreneurs were sufficiently motivated to respond to the survey (which 
had a response rate of about 30 percent). One likely effect of this problem is to reduce the 
cross-country variation in these indicators, making it more difficult, other things equal, to 
reject null hypotheses. Given these problems—especially the small number of countries 
surveyed and the small number of entrepreneurs sampled in each country—it is all the 
more remarkable that Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder find significant links to investment 
and growth. 
 
“Contract-Intensive Money” 
In response to the perceived shortcomings of subjective measures, Clague and others 
(1999) introduced an objective measure called ―contract-intensive money,‖ equal to the 
proportion of M2 not constituted by currency outside banks. Data coverage for contract-
intensive money over time and across countries, calculated from standard monetary 
indicators, is far superior to that of any of the subjective measures. Moreover, because it 
is objectively measured, contract-intensive money is not subject to contamination by 
knowledge of recent economic performance by country experts or surveyed 
entrepreneurs, removing an important potential source of endogeneity.  
 
 The logic behind using contract-intensive money is that for various reasons 
individuals will hold a larger proportion of their financial assets in the form of currency 
in environments in which third-party enforcement of contracts is unreliable. Bank 
deposits are less safe in environments in which one cannot rely on contracts. Not only are 
banks more likely to default on their obligations, but governments unable or unwilling to 
enforce contracts between private parties are unlikely to respect private property 
themselves (by refraining from expropriating bank deposits, for example). The contract-
intensive money ratio is the outcome of choices by wealth-maximizing firms and 
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individuals: it will increase in countries in which governments better enforce and respect 
contracts and private property rights. Where property and contract rights are less clearly 
defined and secure, borrowers will find it more difficult to offer collateral as security 
against default, inhibiting the development of financial institutions and sophisticated 
financial instruments and limiting the availability of money other than currency. 
 
 Clague and others show that contract-intensive money is significantly and 
positively correlated with growth rates and (even more strongly) with investment’s share 
of GDP over the 1970–92 period. Each one standard deviation increase in contract-
intensive money (about 0.14) is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in growth 
and a 2.5 percentage point increase in investment’s share of GDP in Barro-type 
regressions. Findings are very similar if the initial value for contract-intensive money 
(from 1969) is substituted for the period (1969–90) average to minimize endogeneity 
problems. Results are not sensitive to controlling for inflation (which makes holding 
currency less attractive) or for the ratio of M2 to GDP, the most common measure of 
financial development,. 
 
 Despite its virtues as an easily measured, objective indicator with broad coverage 
over time and across countries, contract-intensive money is an imperfect indicator, 
because it only partially captures variations in the institutional environment. It measures 
the tradeoff between holding assets in only one of two forms: currency and bank deposits. 
Ideally, a broader measure could be constructed that captures holdings of foreign 
currencies, gold, and other assets (which should constitute a higher proportion of assets in 
countries with poor contract enforcement). Unfortunately, the data do not permit 
construction of such indicators for a reasonable size sample of countries.  
 
 All of these studies point to significant and positive relations between good 
governance and growth, with strong indications that good governance causes higher 
growth. While any single measure of government social capital is imperfect, the 
shortcomings of each of the various measures used in the literature are largely 
independent of one another. The empirical findings generated by this body of work must 
therefore be taken very seriously.  
 
Civil Social Capital 
Civil social capital can affect economic performance through two major channels: 
microeconomic and macropolitical. At the microeconomic level, social ties and 
interpersonal trust can reduce transactions costs, help enforce contracts, and improve 
access to credit for individual investors. At the macropolitical level, social cohesion and 
civic engagement can strengthen democratic governance (Almond and Verba 1963), 
improve the efficiency and honesty of public administration (Putnam 1993), and improve 
the quality of economic policies (Easterly and Levine 1997). For the most part, formal 
theory about microeconomic level effects is better developed than is theory about 
macropolitical channels. (The exception is Alesina and Drazen 1991, which sets forth a 
theory of macro channels. For microeconomic effects, see Zak and Knack 2001; Greif 
1993.) The empirical literature represents a mix of the two channels. In some studies the 
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evidence simply shows that civil social capital matters for economic performance, with 
no attempt to distinguish microeconomic from macropolitical channels.   
 
Civic Community and Government Performance  
 
Helliwell and Putnam (1995) provide a rigorous test of Putnam’s (1993) hypothesis on 
the role of social capital in accounting for variations in economic performance in 
different parts of Italy. They test three alternative regional indicators of social capital 
(borrowed from Putnam), all of which they find to be positively and significantly related 
to growth over the 1950–90 period, controlling for 1950 per capita income. The simplest 
indicator is based on surveys of citizen satisfaction with the activities of regional 
governments. This measure aggregates the share of respondents who were ―very‖ or 
―rather‖ satisfied by region over all such surveys conducted between 1977 and 1988.  
 
 The second indicator measures regional government performance by aggregating 
12 variables—some objective, others subjective—into a single index. Variables include 
the timeliness of budgets, legislative innovation, and the speed and accuracy of responses 
to requests for information.  
 
 The third measure is an index of ―civic community,‖ based on four components: 
newspaper reading, number of sports and cultural organizations, turnout in referendums, 
and the incidence of preference voting (a proxy for patron-client networks, which Putnam 
view as antithetical to social capital). Civic community is viewed as a determinant of 
institutional performance, leading to greater citizen satisfaction with regional 
government. Putnam (1993) had earlier demonstrated strong relationships among the 
regions between civic community and government performance and between civic 
community and citizen satisfaction with government. 
 
 Helliwell and Putnam (1995) emphasize the effects of institutional performance 
on growth, arguing that the civic community and citizen satisfaction indicators are 
proxies for regional government performance, which is difficult to measure directly. 
They also note, however, that social capital could influence the efficiency of operations 
within individual firms, an idea discussed at much greater length in Putnam (1993). 
Conceivably, then, civic community could be related to growth independently of its 
effects on government performance. Helliwell and Putnam do not test for the relative 
importance of microeconomic and macropolitical channels, however, as their regressions 
never include more than one of the three social capital indicators at a time.  
 
Generalized Trust 
Fukuyama (1995) appears to have been the first scholar to attribute cross-national 
differences in economic performance to variations in trust and ―spontaneous sociability.‖ 
Although these dimensions of civil social capital are not perfect substitutes for contract 
and commercial law,  
 
the presence of a high degree of trust as an additional condition of economic 
relations can increase economic efficiency by reducing . . . transactions costs, 
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incurred by activities like finding the appropriate buyer or seller, negotiating a 
contract, complying with government regulations, and enforcing that contract in 
the event of dispute or fraud. Each of these transactions is made easier if the 
parties believe in each other's basic honesty: there is less need to spell things out 
in lengthy contracts; less need to hedge against unexpected contingencies; fewer 
disputes, and less need to litigate if disputes arise. (p. 151) 
 
 Fukuyama stresses the relation between social capital and industrial organization, 
arguing that where trust does not extend beyond the family, the supply of capital and of 
qualified managers is limited, constraining the scale of private firms. More generally, he 
argues that higher-trust societies are better able to implement efficient organizational 
innovations when changes in technology or other factors make existing organizational 
forms obsolete. Trust can influence economic outcomes through macropolitical channels 
as well, because ―sociability is also a vital support for self-governing political 
institutions‖ (p. 325), as it is in Putnam (1993).  
 
 Fukuyama's empirical evidence is mostly descriptive and qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Based on impressionistic evidence, he classifies the United States, Japan, 
and Germany as high-trust societies and France, Italy, China, the Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong (China), and Taiwan (China) as low-trust societies,  
 
 La Porta and others (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) use data from the World 
Values Surveys to conduct systematic tests of Putnam's and Fukuyama's hypotheses. 
These surveys polled roughly 1,000 respondents in each of several dozen countries. The 
first round of surveys, conducted in the early 1980s, included mostly industrial countries. 
The second, larger round, conducted in the early 1990s, included more developing 
countries and transition economies. The surveys were intended to be nationally 
representative, but urban areas and better-educated people are believed to be somewhat 
overrepresented, particularly in developing countries (Inglehart 1994).  
 
  Trust values for each country are calculated as the percentage of respondents who 
agree with the statement that ―most people can be trusted‖ rather than with the statement 
that ―you can't be too careful in dealing with people.‖ Values range from about 8 percent 
for Brazil to about 60 percent for the Nordic countries.  
 
 La Porta and others (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) show that trust is 
associated with better ratings on subjective measures of government efficiency, 
corruption, and infrastructure quality (from ICRG and other sources).
7
 Knack and Keefer 
also find that trust in people strongly predicts World Values Survey measures of 
confidence in government institutions. These findings are consistent with Putnam's 
(1993) finding that government performance is higher in Italian regions scoring higher on 
                                                 
7
La Porta and others control for per capita income, include all countries for which data 
were available, and use trust values from the second round of surveys. Knack and Keefer 
control for income and education, exclude countries that were once communist, and use 
the results of the first round of surveys on trust. [Is this what you mean?] 
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social capita indicators. La Porta and others also find that higher-trust societies have 
lower infant mortality, controlling for income, a result found in the United States by 
Kawachi and others (1997).  
 
 La Porta and others test Fukuyama's firm scale hypothesis, regressing the ratio of 
the revenues of the 20 largest firms to GDP on per capita income, trust in people, and a 
measure of trust in family members. The scale measure is unrelated to income, strongly 
and positively related to trust in people, and strongly and negatively related to trust in 
family, providing striking support for Fukuyama. 
 
 Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) provide the most extensive 
cross-country tests of the relation between trust in people and economic performance. For 
the 29 market economies included in the World Values Surveys, Knack and Keefer add 
the survey’s trust measure to Barro-type investment and growth regressions. Each 12 
percentage point increase in trust is associated with an increase in annual income growth 
of about 1 percentage point. Each 7 percentage point increase in trust is associated with a 
1 percentage point increase in investment's share of GDP. Given the wide range of 
observed values for trust (54.5 percentage points separate Norway from Brazil), these are 
very large effects.  
 
 Because trust is measured in 1980 or 1981 for most of the sample and in 1990 for 
the remainder, the dependent variables in Knack and Keefer (1997) are measured for the 
1980–92 period. Results for growth but not for investment are weaker when longer 
periods (1970–92 or 1960–92) are used. As a correction for possible endogeneity of trust, 
Knack and Keefer also report two-stage least squares estimates, using ethnic 
homogeneity and the number of law students as a fraction of all postsecondary students 
as exogenous instruments. Trust remains a significant predictor of growth for the 1980–
92 period. Testing an interaction term comprising per capita income and trust, Knack and 
Keefer find that the impact of trust on growth is significantly higher for poorer countries, 
suggesting that interpersonal trust is more important where legal systems and financial 
markets are less well developed.    
 
 Zak and Knack (2001) present a general equilibrium growth model in which 
investors of varying types (defined by ethnicity, class, age or other differences) are 
randomly matched each period with brokers of varying types, where trust declines with 
differences in type. Low trust is predicted to reduce investment and growth. Their 
empirical work adds 12 countries to the 29-country sample used by Knack and Keefer 
(1997), using data from a third round of WVS surveys conducted in 1995–96 (see annex). 
Their results strengthen earlier findings: trust is significantly related to growth even for 
longer periods, such as 1970–92, and the estimated impact of trust on growth is less 
sensitive to model specification than in Knack and Keefer (1997).  
 
 Zak and Knack (2001) report that trust is higher in countries with stronger formal 
institutions for enforcing contracts and reducing corruption and in countries with less-
polarized populations (as measured by income or land inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, 
and a subjective measure of the intensity of economic discrimination). They also show 
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that formal institutions and polarization appear to affect growth rates partly through their 
effect on trust. Income inequality, land inequality, discrimination, and corruption, for 
example, are associated with significantly lower growth rates, but the association of these 
variables with growth dramatically weakens when trust is controlled for.   
 
 Several other studies briefly report tests of the relation between trust and growth. 
La Porta and others find that trust in people is positively associated with growth 
(significant at the 10 percent level) over the 1970–93 period, controlling only for 1970 
per capita income. Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996a) test trust and five other 
―cultural‖ variables in growth regressions for the 1980–89 period. Controlling for per 
capita income levels and primary education enrollment in 1980, they find that trust is 
positively and significantly related to growth.  
 
 Helliwell (1996) finds that trust and an index of group memberships are each 
negatively and significantly related to productivity growth for a sample of 17 OECD 
members. His sample omits the poor- and middle-income countries for which trust has 
the largest effects (Knack and Keefer 1997). In examining productivity growth only, 
Helliwell neglects the possibility that trust influences income growth largely through 
factor accumulation channels, as Knack and Keefer (1997) show.   
 
 In their investment and growth tests, Knack and Keefer (1997) supplement the 
trust in people measure with an indicator of trustworthiness based on other items in the 
World Values Surveys. They construct an index of trustworthiness, or of the strength of 
"civic norms," from responses to five questions about whether various forms of cheating 
are ever justifiable. The items include cheating on taxes, claiming government benefits to 
which one is not entitled, failing to report damage one has done accidentally to a parked 
vehicle, avoiding paying a fare on public transport, and keeping money one finds. As 
with trust in people, this civic norms index is positively and significantly related to 
growth over the 1980–92 period and to investment over various periods (1960–92, 1970–
92, 1980–92).  
 
 Few of these studies devote any attention to measurement issues, neglecting the 
possibility that translation differences or less than fully random samples could introduce 
substantial error into country-level estimates of trust derived from the World Values 
Surveys. An exception is Knack and Keefer (1997), who find that trust is strongly 
correlated (r = .67) across countries with the percentage of ―lost‖ wallets returned in 
experiments conducted by Reader's Digest. This result is consistent with the view that 
nonrandom samples and translation difficulties do not introduce severe measurement 
error in the cross-country trust data. The high correlation between the trust indicator and 
returned wallets and the low correlation between the trust indicator and trust in family 
members also suggest that the trust indicator is capturing generalized trust (trust in 
strangers) rather than specific or particularized trust in people with whom one has 
repeated interactions or who belong to the same groups. This is an important finding, as 
generalized trust is viewed by most social capital theorists as a source of reduced 
transactions costs and reduced social conflict (Zak and Knack 2001), whereas 
particularized trust has more ambiguous implications for economic performance. 
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Cooperation and trust within ethnic groups or special interest groups can facilitate their 
organization for rent-seeking purposes or even violent conflict (Knack and Keefer 1997).   
 
Group Membership 
Putnam (1993) views memberships in horizontal (i.e. non-hierearchical) associations as a 
source of trust and of social ties conducive to economic performance. Olson’s (1982) 
view of associations is much less favorable; he emphasizes their growth-impairing, rent-
seeking functions. Knack and Keefer (1997) test these alternative theories using World 
Values Survey data on group memberships in 26 market economies. The surveys asked 
respondents whether they belonged to any of 10 types of organizations. Knack and 
Keefer calculate the mean number of group memberships per respondent and compute 
country averages.  
 
  In Barro-type regressions, group memberships are found to be unrelated to growth 
and negatively related to investment rates. These findings offer no support to Putnam 
(1993) and little support to Olson (1982). Knack and Keefer conjecture that both could be 
right, however, with the positive effects of groups hypothesized by Putnam canceling out 
the negative effects stressed by Olson. They attempt to provide a finer test by 
disaggregating groups into those that seem to have primarily social goals (―Putnam 
groups‖) and those that are more likely to engage in lobbying (―Olson groups‖). 
Memberships in Olson groups (trade unions, political parties or groups, professional 
associations) shows no significant relation to growth or investment rates. Paradoxically, 
Putnam groups (religious organizations, youth groups, and education, arts, music, or 
cultural activities) show a strong but association with investment and no significant 
association with growth.  
 
 There are several possible explanations for these surprising findings. It could be 
that the World Values Surveys data on group memberships are faulty. The categories of 
groups included in the surveys are very broad, making it difficult to confidently 
distinguish rent-seeking from purely social groups, and the depth of commitment to 
groups is not measured. However, there are serious theoretical deficiencies in the 
perspectives on groups advanced by both  (1993) and Olson (1982). Putnam claims that 
associations ―instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-
spiritedness‖ (pp. 89-90). But many (even purely social) groups segregated by class, 
occupation, or ethnicity may build cooperation and trust only among group members, 
perhaps even encouraging distrust between members and nonmembers. Olson's 
predictions on growth and groups overlook the fact that professional or trade associations 
that engage in special-interest lobbying activities may also enforce ethical codes and 
standards that build generalized trust (Bergsten 1985) and reduce transactions costs by 
spreading information about the identity of cheaters (Bernstein 1992).  
 
Social Polarization  
Several studies focus on ethnic divisions and inequality as sources of slower growth 
through their effects on trust, social cohesion, economic policymaking, and even violent 
conflict. Most of these studies posit macropolitical channels through which polarization 
impairs economic performance. (An exception is the model of Zak and Knack 2001, in 
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which the strength of informal sanctions against cheating weakens with social distance, 
increasing monitoring costs of contractual agreements between investor-broker pairs.) 
 
 Easterly and Levine (1997) show that more ethnically heterogeneous societies 
grow more slowly than others, controlling for the usual growth regressors. The predicted 
growth rate for the most homogeneous societies (such as Japan) exceeds the predicted 
rate for the most heterogeneous societies (such as Tanzania) by more than 2 percentage 
points. Ethnic heterogeneity is correlated with a range of indicators of inefficient policies, 
including a high black market currency premium, high levels of corruption, low 
schooling rates, a lack of financial development, and poor infrastructure.  
 
 Easterly and Levine argue that ethnic divisions increase polarization of 
preferences for public goods, impeding agreement over their provision. (Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly 1996 provide evidence from U.S. city and county data supporting this 
hypothesis.) Ethnically divided societies will also be prone to competitive rent-seeking, 
with increased incentives for the group in power to create rents (through overvalued 
exchange rates and other means) that accrue to their own ethnic group at the expense of 
others. As Easterly and Levine acknowledge, however, ethnic divisions generally remain 
a significant predictor of slower growth even when a wide range of policies is controlled 
for, consistent with the possibility that polarization influences growth through 
microeconomic channels as well.  
 Building on models of social choice under polarized preferences, Keefer and 
Knack (1995) find that property rights are more uncertain in highly polarized societies, as 
measured not only by ethnic tensions and heterogeneity but by income and land 
inequality as well. Berg and Sachs (1988) test the effects of income inequality on 
indebtedness, finding that countries with high income inequality are more likely to 
default on sovereign debt, as indicated by discounts on country debt in secondary 
markets. They conclude that the adoption of needed policy changes (including trade 
liberalization and deficit cutting) on a timely basis is hindered by high income inequality. 
Using a wider array of polarization indicators and a subjective indicator of the likelihood 
of default, Keefer and Knack (1995) corroborate the Berg and Sachs findings for a much 
larger sample of countries.  
 
 Keefer and Knack (1995) examine various arguments explaining why inequality 
is commonly linked empirically with slower growth, as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
other have shown. They present evidence that inequality’s impact on growth occurs at 
least partly through increasing the uncertainty of property rights. Controlling for the 
ICRG property rights index, they show that the estimated impacts of income and land 
inequality on growth diminish substantially but do not disappear. Their results leave open 
the possibility that polarization may have more direct effects on economic performance—
by impairing the social and psychological basis for trust among individual transactors, for 
example. Consistent with this possibility, Zak and Knack (2001) find that income and 
land inequality are strongly associated with slower growth in their 41-country sample but 
that the association disappears when the World Values Surveys trust indicator is 
controlled for.  
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 Rodrik (1999) constructs a simple model of social conflict in which a country’s 
ability to adjust efficiently to exogenous shocks (such as adverse shifts in the terms of 
trade) is a function of ―latent social conflict‖ and ―institutions of conflict management.‖ 
Efficient adjustment to adverse shocks often has substantial distributional consequences: 
where deep social cleavages exist along ethnic or other lines, negotiating a new social 
bargain will take longer, as Alesina and Drazen (1991) show. Strong conflict 
management institutions essentially provide rules that reduce the share of society’s 
resources that the competing groups can potentially capture. Rodrik hypothesizes that 
adverse shocks will be more harmful for growth when latent conflicts are more severe 
and when rules effectively constrain the stakes of the conflict.  
 
 Rodrik’s dependent variable is the change in the average annual growth rate 
between 1960–74 and 1975–89. Low values are identified with growth ―collapses,‖ in 
which economies that grew rapidly before the shocks of the 1970s subsequently stagnated 
or shrank. He finds that changes in the terms of trade during the 1970s are associated 
with larger declines in growth, although this result is sensitive to changes in the sample 
and the model specification. Countries with smaller declines in growth have better 
conflict management institutions, as proxied by Gastil's civil liberties and political 
freedoms indicators, indexes from ICRG or BI, and social security and welfare 
expenditures. Smaller declines in growth are also associated with less severe latent social 
conflict, as measured by income or land inequality, ethnic diversity or tensions, and the 
World Values Surveys trust indicator.  
 
 Rodrik’s central hypothesis calls for testing three-way interaction terms: shocks 
harm growth more when latent conflict is worse and institutions are weaker. He 
constructs several of these interaction terms, multiplying the change in the terms of trade 
by a latent conflict proxy and a conflict management proxy (for example, ethnic 
heterogeneity and the Gastil index). As predicted, higher values of these terms are 
associated with larger growth collapses. However, none of the components of the 
interaction terms is allowed to enter the regression independently, because the model 
specification forces all of the growth effects of any one component (such as ethnic 
heterogeneity) to be conditional on the levels of the other component. A properly 
specified test of the basic hypothesis, recognizing the many other theories on how 
polarization and institutions influence economic performance, would allow the data 
rather than the researcher to decide whether they influence growth only by conditioning 
responses to external shocks.    
 
 Collier (1998b) views the impact of ethnic diversity as being conditional on 
political institutions. According to him, ―an ethnically diverse society [may] gain more 
from democracy than a homogeneous society because the latter has less need of dispute 
resolution.‖ (p. 5) Collier finds empirical support for this proposition in a sample of 94 
countries (1960–90). In his sample the harmful effects of ethnic heterogeneity on growth 
are significantly stronger among countries with fewer political freedoms, as measured by 
the Gastil index.  
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 The impact of ethnic diversity on social and political outcomes often turns out to 
be nonlinear. As Horowitz (1985) notes, polarization can be greatest when there are a 
small number of groups of roughly equal size. With a proliferation of small groups, no 
one group will normally have the incentive or opportunity to impose its will on all others. 
Collier (1998b) finds some evidence that the likelihood of civil wars is greatest for 
countries that rank in the middle in terms of ethnic heterogeneity. Interpersonal trust also 
initially declines as heterogeneity increases before rising again (Zak and Knack 2001). 
Keefer and Knack (1995) find that the uncertainty of property rights is greatest for 
countries in the middle of the ethnic heterogeneity rankings.  
 
Cultural Explanations: “Achievement Motivation” and Communitarianism 
 
Participants in a symposium in the American Journal of Political Science debated the 
importance of cultural influences on economic performance (Granato, Inglehart, and 
Leblang 1996a, 1996b; Jackman and Miller 1996; Swank 1996). Building on Weber’s 
Protestant ethic thesis, Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996b) hypothesize that norms 
encourage social mobility and the accumulation of human and physical capital in some 
societies but discourage them in others, with implications for economic development. 
Using World Values Surveys data from 25 countries, they find that an index of 
―achievement motivation‖ is positively and significantly related to growth in a Barro-type 
model.  
 
 Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang construct the achievement motivation index from 
responses about traits children should be encouraged to acquire. Index values equal the 
percentage of the population in each country that cites ―thrift‖ or ―determination‖ minus 
the percentage that cites ―obedience‖ or ―religious faith.‖ Because growth is measured for 
1960–89 and the index is measured from surveys conducted in the early 1990s, their 
results could easily be driven by reverse causation. The social and geographic mobility 
induced by rapid growth, for example, could disrupt traditional social ties that encourage 
obedience and religious faith (Olson 1963).  
 
 Achievement motivation is hypothesized to influence economic performance by 
increasing individuals’ willingness to save, invest, work hard, and acquire productive 
knowledge. Swank (1996) takes a macropolitical approach, building in part on Olson’s 
(1982) theory of ―encompassing interests.‖ He argues that economic policymaking will 
be less conflictual and more conducive to growth in ―communitarian‖ societies, including 
―social corporatist‖ polities such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden and 
―Confucian statist‖ polities such as China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Adding 
dummy variables for ―corporatist‖ and ―Confucian‖ to the Granato, Inglehard, and 
Leblang (1996b) model, Swank shows that growth rates are significantly higher in those 
societies and that once these additional variables are controlled for, achievement 
motivation is no longer related to growth. Unexplained is how Confucianist norms, long 
believed inimical to economic progress, suddenly became conducive to rapid growth in 
recent decades.    
 
Poverty, Income Distribution, and Social Capital 
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Evidence from household and village studies suggests that civil social capital in the form 
of trust or social ties can play an important role in alleviating poverty (Grootaert 1999; 
Narayan and Pritchett 1999). The rich, it can be argued, have much less to gain than the 
poor from membership in groups that provide mutual aid or health or education services, 
because they can afford to purchase these services (Grootaert 1999). Similarly, 
institutions or cultural traditions that broaden participation (as proxied by Gastil’s civil 
liberties index) can be expected to have progressive effects, extending to poor people the 
kind of political influence and access that the rich tend to have in all societies.  
 
  The distributional implications of government social capital are more ambiguous. 
Secure property rights and effective contract enforcement are often viewed as benefiting 
primarily the rich at the expense of the poor. This perception is based on the intuition that 
unlike rich landowners or capitalists, the poor have little property to protect. Similarly, 
contractual agreements are often perceived as the product of unequal bargaining power, 
with rich creditors, landowners, or capitalists enforcing contract provisions against poor 
borrowers, tenants, employees, or consumers. 
 
 But institutions for promoting property rights and enforcement of contracts may 
have powerful egalitarian effects, enabling individuals with little property and no political 
connections to invest in human capital and small enterprises. Fair and transparent 
procedures for property, contracts, and government regulation of business facilitate the 
entry of informal sector entrepreneurs and workers—most of whom belong to low- or 
middle-income groups—into the formal sector and promote the accumulation of physical 
and human capital, raising profits and wages (de Soto 1989). Strong and predictable 
property and contract rights are necessary for the emergence of well-developed financial 
markets, which are at least as important for poor and middle-income borrowers as for the 
well off, who can more easily arrange alternative sources of credit. Unlike the rich, the 
poor may be dependent on credit for acquiring secondary school education, which has a 
high cost in terms of forgone income in developing countries.  
 
 Thus one could argue that the institutions that best ensure property rights and 
contract enforceability are the very institutions that best improve the welfare of the poor. 
Olson (1994) goes even farther, arguing that much of the poverty in the developing world 
is the product of institutions chosen by politically connected individuals and groups in 
their own interests. Bureaucratic corruption enriches government officials, for example, 
who supplement their salaries with bribes obtained by imposing burdensome procedures 
for obtaining licenses and permits.  
 
 This rest of this section examines empirically the relation between social capital 
indicators and measures of poverty and distribution. One way to address this question is 
by noting that property rights are significantly related to growth (Knack and Keefer 1995) 
and that growth is associated with reductions in poverty rates (Squire 1993). Thus 
property rights must make the poor better off. It is conceivable, however, that the source 
of growth matters. Most episodes of growth are accompanied by reductions in poverty, 
but the exceptions could be those in which, for example, growth is generated by secure 
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and stable property and contract rights rather than by public investments in primary or 
secondary education, health, or infrastructure. New and direct evidence on these issues is 
presented in this section.   
 
Income Distribution 
To test the effect of social capital on income distribution, we use the Gini coefficients of 
income inequality and income share by quintile from the ―high quality‖ subset of the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) time-series compilation. The change in Gini coefficients is 
computed for roughly the 1970–92 period.  (Inequality data are not available for every 
year for every country, so beginning and end years may differ somewhat across 
countries.)  
 
 Average annual growth in per capita income was computed for each of the five 
income quintiles for the same period, using the purchasing power-adjusted income data 
from Summers and Heston (1991). The initial-year per capita income for each country is 
first multiplied by the initial-year share of each quintile and then multiplied by five to 
obtain the per capita income for each quintile. This procedure is repeated using end-year 
values; average annual growth in per capita income is computed from these initial- and 
end-year per capita income levels (table 11.1). 
 
             Table 11. 1 Countries Included in One or More Regressions  
Country Gini 1990 – Gini 
1970 
ICRG BERI CIM Trust 
Australia 9.7     
Bangladesh 2.8  x   
Brazil 1.99     
Canada -4.65     
Chile 11.88     
Colombia -0.7     
Costa Rica 1.67  x  x 
Denmark 2.20     
Dominican 
Republic 
4.00  x   
Finland -5.69  x   
France  -11.3     
Germany -5.47     
Greece 0.08     
Hong King 4.1  x x x 
Honduras -9.25  x  x 
Hungary 9.44 x x x  
India 1.64     
Indonesia 0.99    x 
Iran -2.55    x 
Ireland -4.09     
Italy -4.11     
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Jamaica -2.79  x  x 
Japan -0.5     
Korea, Rep. of 0.34     
Malaysia -1.65     
Mexico -2.72     
Netherlands 0.78     
New Zealand 10.16  x  x 
Norway -2.73     
Pakistan 1.24    x 
Panama -0.53  x x x 
Philippines -4.39     
Poland 3.27 x x x  
Portugal -4.95     
Singapore -2    x 
Spain -11.2     
Sri Lanka 8.99  x  x 
Sweden -0.97     
 
Taiwan (China) 0.69   x  
Tanzania -0.9  x  x 
Thailand 8.87    x 
Tunisia -2.06  x  x 
Turkey -11.91     
United Kingdom 7.3     
United States 4.3     
Venezuela, R.B. de 6.19    x 
Yugoslavia -0.12  x x x 
 
  
 We calculate standard Barro-type growth regressions for the sample of countries 
for which data on quintile shares are available, where the dependent variable is average 
annual income growth over the 1970–92 period (table 11.2). Independent variables are 
(the log of) 1970 per capita income as a share of U.S. income; mean years of completed 
education for people 25 and older in 1970 (from Barro and Lee 1993); the trade intensity 
ratio averaged over the growth period (exports plus imports as a share of GDP, from 
Summers and Heston 1991); and the ICRG index of property rights, as constructed by 
Knack and Keefer (1995). Most results for this 37-country sample are consistent with 
those generated from larger samples: incomes converge conditional on other variables 
included in the model, and education, trade intensity, and property rights are all 
associated with higher growth rates. Education and trade intensity are not significant in 
this sample, however. The ICRG index coefficient implies that each 10-point increase in 
the 50-point scale is associated with an increase in growth of nearly 1.6 percentage points 
a year.  
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 Table 11.2 also reports analogous tests in which the dependent variable is the 
growth of incomes for each quintile, from the poorest (Q1) to the richest (Q5). In addition 
to the regressors included in tests of growth overall, the quintile growth regressions 
control for initial quintile share. Where the initial quintile share is already relatively high, 
that quintile’s income growth is less likely to get a boost from further increases in the 
share, so the expectation is that the sign on this coefficient will be negative. As expected, 
all coefficients are negative, but they are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
 
 The ICRG coefficients are slightly smaller for the poorer two quintiles than for 
the richer three, but these differences are not statistically significant. For the regression 
for the second quintile, which produces the lowest ICRG coefficient (0.133), the null 
hypothesis that the ICRG coefficient is equal to 0.166 (its highest value, from quintile 4) 
cannot be rejected. Trade openness generates somewhat larger coefficient estimates for 
the poorer quintiles, although the differences across quintiles are not significant.  
 
 Interestingly, the model better explains growth variations for the richer quintiles 
than for the poorer ones: adjusted R
2
 values steadily increase (from 0.27 for quintile 1 to 
0.56 for quintile 5) and standard errors steadily fall (from 1.9 to 1.2). This difference may 
be caused by greater measurement error in attempting to measure percentage point 
changes in small numbers (incomes of the poor) than in large numbers (incomes of the 
rich). There is no evidence in these data of a global trend toward greater or lesser 
inequality of incomes within countries, as mean growth rates vary little across the 
quintiles (from 2.15 percent to 2.27 percent).    
 
 Table 11.2 ICRG Relation between Index and Income Growth by Quintile, 1970–92 
Variable Overall Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Intercept 5.044 
(1.260) 
6.397 
(1.575) 
5.721 
(1.462) 
5.679 
(1.456) 
7.182 
(1.481) 
6.267 
(2.040) 
Log (income/U.S. income), 1970  -2.705 
(0.577) 
-2.366 
(0.640) 
-2.484 
(0.691) 
-2.573 
(0.619) 
-2.615 
(0.587) 
-2.908 
(0.629) 
Quintile share, 1970  -0.225 
(0.123) 
-0.057 
(0.106) 
-0.057 
(0.095) 
-0.129 
(0.077) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
Mean years education 1970 0.068 
(0.108) 
0.053 
(0.174) 
-0.048 
(0.143) 
-0.028 
(0.123) 
0.070 
(0.108) 
0.170 
(0.110) 
Trade intensity, 1970–90 mean 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
ICRG index of property rights 0.157 
(0.028) 
0.133 
(0.030) 
0.147 
(0.032) 
0.165 
(0.029) 
0.166 
(0.029) 
0.151 
(0.032) 
Adjusted R2 .56 .27 .39 .46 .52 .56 
Standard error of the estimate 1.18 1.86 1.58 1.45 1.34 1.19 
Mean, dependent variable  2.22 2.15 2.26 2.27 2.22 2.22 
  Note: Number = 37. White-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 
 A similar set of regression results for growth over the shorter (1980–92) period 
(which also differs slightly for some countries) is shown in table 11.3. Because the ICRG 
index is measured in 1982, this period is less subject to endogeneity problems than the 
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longer period. The disadvantage of using shorter periods is that growth variations are 
driven more by shocks and are more difficult to explain with models designed to account 
for cross-country variations in long-run growth.  
 
Table 11.3 Relation between Social Capital and Income Growth by Quintile  
 
 
 
 
Item 
ICRG  
Income growth 1980–
92 
BERI  
Income growth 1970–
92 
Overall 0.196 (0.038) 0.360 (0.110) 
Quintile 1 (poorest) 0.331 (0.099) 0.580 (0.158) 
Quintile 2 0.209 (0.061) 0.575 (0.118) 
Quintile 3 0.214 (0.050) 0.581 (0.090) 
Quintile 4 0.217 (0.038) 0.544 (0.079) 
Quintile 5 (richest) 0.164 (0.044) 0.256 (0.133) 
Number 39 27 
 
Note: White-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. Other independent variables are initial per capita income, 
initial quintile share (except in ―overall‖ growth equation), initial mean years completed education, and period mean of 
trade intensity ratio.  
 
 The ICRG column in table 11.3 reports the coefficients and standard errors for the 
ICRG index from a set of six regressions identical to those in table 11.2 (with other 
independent variables appropriately adjusted to 1980). The coefficient is at its highest 
(0.331) for the poorest quintile—twice as high as for the richest quintile (0.164). The null 
hypothesis that the fifth quintile coefficient is 0.331 can be rejected at the 5 percent level. 
 
 Regressions were also run using the BERI property rights index. Because the 
BERI index is measured in 1972, there is less potential for reverse causation than with 
ICRG, so only the 1970–92 growth period is analyzed. The growth effects of BERI for 
the four poorest quintiles vary only trivially, with each 2-point increase in the 16-point 
scale raising growth by more than 1 percentage point for each quintile. This impact 
declines by more than half for the richest quintile, where an increase in BERI of 4 points 
is required to raise growth 1 percentage point. The coefficient for the fifth quintile 
(0.256) is significantly smaller than for the other quintiles.   
 
 Similar tests were conducted using contract-intensive money and the World 
Values Surveys trust indicator as social capital measures. In these small samples, neither 
proves to be a significant determinant of growth, either for overall growth or for the 
growth of incomes in any of the five quintiles.  
 
 The findings in tables 11.2 and 11.3 strongly indicate that government social 
capital improves incomes for all groups, not merely those with the most property in need 
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of protection. If anything, incomes of the poor increase more rapidly than those of the 
rich when the quality of governance is higher, as shown by the pattern of coefficients in 
table 11.3.  
 
 Similar tests were run with changes in the Gini index of income inequality 
between 1970 and 1992 as the dependent variable (table 11.4). These samples are 
somewhat larger than in the quintiles regressions, because Squire and Deininger (1996) 
include more Gini values than quintile share values.  
 
Table 11.4. Relation between Social Capital and Changes in Gini Coefficient of Income 
Inequality, 1970–92  
Variable ICRG BERI Trust 
Intercept 6.276 
(3.517) 
12.049 
(4.552) 
11.965 
(5.220) 
Gini coefficient 
 
-0.143 
(0.084) 
-0.139 
(0.101) 
-0.280 
(0.113) 
Mean years 
education  
0.773 
(0.392) 
1.622 
(0.402) 
0.603 
(0.449) 
Trade intensity 0.008 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.030 
(0.024) 
ICRG index  -0.148 
(0.082) 
 
 
 
BERI index   -1.630 
(0.375) 
 
Trust   -0.117 
(0.073) 
Number 45 32 30 
R
2
 .14 .30 .18 
Adjusted R
2
 .05 .20 .05 
Standard error of 
the estimate 
5.40 5.04 5.76 
Mean, dependent 
variable  
-0.16 -0.55 -0.50 
    
  Note: White-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 
 Gini values converge in this sample (conditional on the other regressors), as 
higher initial levels of the Gini index are associated with larger (but not always 
significant) declines over the period. Higher educational attainment is associated, 
somewhat surprisingly, with increasing inequality, although this effect is not always 
significant. Trade intensity shows no strong or consistent impact on changes in Gini.  
 
 Higher scores for ICRG and BERI are associated with declines in income 
inequality. For ICRG this relation is only marginally significant at conventional levels: 
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each 7-point increment in the 50-point ICRG scale is associated with a 1-point decline in 
the Gini coefficient. For BERI the relation with Gini declines is highly significant, with 
each 1-point rise in the 16-point BERI scale reducing the Gini coefficient by 1.6 points. 
Inequality also declines in higher-trust societies. Each 8- or 9-point increase in the 
percentage of people trusting is associated with a 1-point decline in the Gini coefficient. 
This partial correlation is only marginally significant, however. The results shown in 
table 11.4, derived using a composite indicator of inequality and a slightly larger sample 
than the earlier tests used, confirm the findings from the quintile growth regressions. All 
of these results show that social capital not only improves economic performance, it is 
progressive, in the sense that it helps the poorer classes more than it helps the richer 
classes.   
 
Absolute Poverty 
Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998) find that growth is unrelated to changes in income 
distribution, implying that absolute poverty should fall with growth. They provide direct 
evidence on this point, showing that a 10 percent increase in per capita income is 
associated with a 20 percent average decline in the percentage of a country’s population 
living on $1 a day or less. In 17 of the 20 countries with data on changes in this measure 
of absolute poverty over time, per capita income and the percentage of people living on 
less than $1 a day move in opposite directions.  
 
  Because the social capital indicators analyzed earlier have either neutral or pro-
egalitarian effects on income distribution and have elsewhere been linked to more rapid 
growth, there is a strong presumption that improvements in the rule of law, property and 
contract rights, and trust in people reduce absolute poverty. Data on changes over time in 
absolute poverty are available for only a very small number of countries. For this reason, 
no direct tests are provided here of the impact of social capital variables on changes in 
absolute poverty. Data on absolute poverty levels are available for enough countries 
represented in the ICRG data set to conduct tests of the effect of government social 
capital on absolute poverty. These tests, of course, are more subject to concern about 
reverse causality than they would be if changes in absolute poverty rates were the 
dependent variable.  
 
 Regressions were run on a sample of 35 countries in which the dependent 
variables are the percentage of a country’s population living on less than $1 a day 
(equations 1 and 3 of Table 11.5) and less than $2 a day (equations 2 and 4). For 
countries with two or more observations on poverty, the most recent one was used. The 
earliest observation used is from 1986; the most recent is from 1995. The mean year is 
1992, with a standard deviation of two years.  
 
 The ICRG index (averaged over 1982–90) is negatively and significantly related 
to poverty levels in equations 1 and 3. Each 1 point rise in the 50-point ICRG index 
reduces the percentage in poverty by slightly more than 1 percentage point on average. 
This relation weakens when per capita income is controlled for (equations 2 and 4), 
indicating that government social capital reduces poverty rates in part by raising incomes 
generally.  
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 These regressions control for a time trend variable, because poverty is measured 
in different years for different countries. ―Year‖ is equal to the year in which poverty is 
measured minus 1985; it thus varies from 1 (poverty measured in 1986) to 10 (poverty 
measured in 1995). Coefficients for this variable are negative and insignificant. 
Education is controlled for, using measures of the percentage of adults who have 
completed primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling. Only secondary education is 
significant. An increase of 5–6 percentage points in secondary schooling is associated 
with a fall in poverty of 1 percentage point.  
 
Table 11.5 Relation between Government Social Capital and Absolute Poverty  
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Equation 1 
(percentage of 
population living 
on less than $1 a 
day) 
Equation 2 
(percentage of 
population living 
on less than $2 a 
day) 
Equation 3 
(percentage of 
population living 
on less than $1 a 
day) 
Equation 4 
(percentage of 
population living 
on less than $2 a 
day) 
Intercept 
 
77.129 
(17.313) 
110.220 
(14.520) 
70.942 
(18.639) 
99.478 
(15.907) 
Year of survey 
 
-0.914 
(1.504) 
-0.777 
(1.539) 
-0.869 
(1.465) 
-0.699 
(1.373) 
Primary school completed (percent) 1.971 
(4.184) 
0.101 
(4.392) 
2.000 
(3.958) 
0.152 
(3.784) 
Secondary school completed 
(percent) 
-19.432 
(7.211) 
-20.029 
(6.798) 
-17.067 
(7.367) 
-15.922 
(6.594) 
Tertiary school completed (percent) -18.791 
(27.808) 
-10.998 
(26.684) 
-0.687 
(28.762) 
20.434 
(26.797) 
ICRG (1982–90 mean) -1.045 
(0.578) 
-1.183 
(0.501) 
-0.671 
(0.651) 
-0.531 
(0.599) 
Per capita income, 1980 (in 
thousands of $) 
  -3.890 
(2.204) 
-6.754 
(2.801) 
R2 .38   .44   .41  .53  
Adjusted R2 .27 .35 .28 .43 
Standard error of the estimate 20.84 20.84 20.69 19.58 
Mean, dependent variable  27.57 52.65 27.57 52.65 
Note: Number = 35. White-corrected standard errors are  shown in parentheses. 
 
 All of these results support the view that social capital reduces poverty rates and 
improves—or at a minimum does not exacerbate—income inequality. Improving 
government and civil social capital are not the only ways, or necessarily the best ways, of 
reducing poverty. But there clearly is no equity-based justification in the data for 
opposing the strengthening of property and contract rights in developing countries.  
 
Conclusion 
Most of the research described here examines ―big picture‖ issues concerning social 
capital and economic performance. It is useful to understand the country-level relations 
between various dimensions of governance or civil society on the one hand and economic 
performance on the other. This body of research is also valuable in illuminating issues 
deserving further study at less aggregated levels or in more detailed ways.  
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 Most of the chapters in this volume explore relations between social capital and 
economic welfare at much lower levels of aggregation. By and large, the findings of these 
micro studies are consistent with those of the macro studies reviewed here. 
 
 More refined studies at the macro level are needed. Ethnic heterogeneity, for 
example, appears to be associated with less efficient policies, less social trust, and slower 
growth. But observation of many successful heterogeneous societies suggests that 
important qualifications may hide behind these simple relations. Under what conditions 
does ethnic heterogeneity fuel conflict and distrust, and under what set of conditions or 
institutions are heterogeneous societies less conflictual? To resolve questions such as 
these, more studies like that of Bates (chapter 7 of this volume), are needed.  
 
 Other needed refinements of macro studies include identifying and collecting 
better and more comprehensive data. Each round of the World Values Surveys adds many 
new countries, improving our knowledge of cross-country differences in levels of trust, 
group membership, and other measures of civil social capital. Increases in the 
sophistication of measurement are equally important, however. The nature of groups’ 
activities and goals, for example, and the composition of their membership may be more 
important for economic welfare than the simple number of group memberships. Some 
more detailed measures are already being collected in some countries, for use in World 
Bank household- or village-level studies.  
 
 Although measurement issues remain, a consensus has developed on the 
importance of government social capital for economic performance; a similar consensus 
is rapidly developing on civil social capital. For this knowledge to have any practical 
implications for policy, the next logical focus of both macro and micro research should 
address the fundamental sources of social capital. 
 
Annex. Data Sources for Cross-Country Social Capital Indicators 
 
This annex provides brief descriptions of the most commonly-used country-level 
indicators of social capital.  More detailed information can be found at the internet sites 
for each source.   
 
Gastil/Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political Freedoms Indexes 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Raymond Gastil constructed cross-country indexes of ―civil 
liberties‖ and ―political freedoms‖ as part of the Comparative Survey of Freedom, 
published by Freedom House, a nonprofit organization dedicated to the promotion of 
democracy, political rights, and civil liberties. Since 1990 the indexes have been 
published without Gastil’s participation. 
 
The index assigns countries scores of 1–7, with lower values assigned to countries 
with greater liberties. (Many users of the indexes have reversed the scale so that larger 
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number indicate greater freedom.) The survey is unusually inclusive, covering about 170 
countries and territories.  
 
 The Gastil/Freedom House index assigns values based on an overall assessment 
of each country in terms of 14 measures of civil liberty and 11 measures of political 
freedom. (Only one value is assigned to each country based on a collective evaluation of 
these criteria; numerical valued are not assigned for each criterion.) The criteria include 
such measures as the existence of an independent judiciary, free trade unions and 
religious institutions, and multiple political parties and the absence of political censorship 
and military or foreign control. (For a discussion of the methodology used to create the 
indexes and some of the problems associated with the ratings, see Gastil 1990, Barro 
1996, and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994. Also see www.freedomhouse.org.) 
 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) has been published monthly since 1982. 
Produced for sale to international investors, the guide is designed to identify political and 
other risks to overseas investments. Country experts prepare in-depth country reports; 
editors assign numerical ratings to each country, based on the country reports and other 
information. Ratings are based on 13 indicators of political risk and 5 measures of 
financial risk. Most researchers have followed Knack and Keefer (1995) in using an 
additive index based on five of these variables: law and order tradition, quality of the 
bureaucracy, corruption in government,  risk of expropriation of private investment, and 
risk of repudiation of contracts by government. (For additional infromation, see 
www.prsgroup.com). 
.  
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI ) has published an operations risk index 
and subindexes since 1972. Scores for all countries are constructed from surveys of a 
panel of about 105 experts, including academics, government officials, bankers, and 
foreign investors, all with extensive international experience. Country ratings are 
produced by omitting the maximum and minimum values and computing the mean of the 
remainder. Subindexes cover political continuity, attitude toward foreign investors and 
profits, degree of nationalization risk, monetary inflation, balance of payments, 
bureaucratic delays, economic growth, currency convertibility, enforcement of contracts, 
labor cost/productivity, professional services and contracts, communications and 
transportation, local management and partners, availability of short-term credit in local 
currency, and availability of long-term credit in local currency. (For additional 
information, see www.beri.com.) 
 
 Because the BERI ratings go back much farther in time than the ICRG ratings, 
they are less subject to reverse causation problems in analyses of long-run economic 
performance. They cover a much smaller number of countries than the ICRG ratings, 
however (about 50 versus 140 covered by ICRG in 1998). Coverage is determined in part 
by investor interest (when countries become extremely poor risks, they are dropped from 
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the sample). The resulting reduction in cross-country variation should make it more 
difficult to find statistically significant links to economic outcomes using these data.  
 
 A second disadvantage of the BERI data is that ratings on bureaucratic delays, 
nationalization risk, and contract enforceability are intercorrelated at about 0.9. The rate 
of intercorrelation among the ICRG components is just 0.6 Very high correlations 
between items suggest that ratings by BERI evaluators may reflect their overall sense of a 
country's investment environment rather than the individual dimensions of that 
environment.  
 
Business International  
Business International provided numerical ratings on various dimensions of investor risk 
between 1971 and 1988. The measures and the sample changed substantially in 1980. 
From 1971 to 1979 Business International rated 57 countries on at least 20 factors, 
including political stability, probability of nationalization, delays in getting approval, 
government intervention in business, and quality of infrastructure. From 1980 to 1988 the 
sample was expanded by about 10 countries, and a different and larger set of indicators 
became available. These include quality of the legal system and judiciary, bureaucracy 
and red tape, corruption, political stability, labor stability, terrorism, probability of 
opposition group takeover, and others.  
 
 The Business International data are less useful than the ICRG or BERI data for 
time-series analyses because each of its two series was published for only about nine 
years. In contrast, ICRG data are available for 17 years, and BERI data are available for 
27 years (and continue to be produced).  
 
Humana's World Human Rights Guide 
 
Charles Humana’s World Human Rights Guide (1984, 1986, 1992) rates 90 or more 
countries on 40 dimensions of human rights. For each dimension, countries are assigned 
to one of four categories depending on the level of rights. Dimensions rated include 
freedom to travel or disseminate information, equality for women and ethnic minorities, 
and various legal and personal rights.  
 
Economic Freedom Indexes 
 
Since 1995 the Heritage Foundation has published an annual index of economic freedom. 
Ten dimensions of economic freedom are rated on a subjective scale of 1 to 5. Most of 
these dimensions are related to economic policies, including banking, trade, tax, and 
monetary policies. Ratings are assigned to more than 100 countries. 
 
 A second economic freedom index is produced annually by the Economic 
Freedom Network, which links dozens of institutes around the world, including the Cato 
Institute in the United States and the Fraser Institute in Canada. The index is based 
largely on objective measures, such as government spending, inflation, and tax rates. 
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Because most of these variables are available over long periods of time, indexes have 
been constructed for the years 1975–95 (Gwartney, Lawson, and Block 1996).  
 
Freedom House sponsored one economic freedom index in the early 1980s 
(Wright 1982) and another in the 1990s (Messick 1996). Both are subjective indexes, 
based on measures such as freedom to have and control property, freedom of association, 
freedom of movement, and freedom of information. 
 
 A fourth economic freedom index is that of Scully (1992). He constructs an index 
of ―economic liberty‖ from 15 indicators from Humana (1986), Wright (1982), Gastil, 
and other sources.  
   
Competitiveness Indexes 
Two organizations produce cross-country numerical ratings of economic 
competitiveness. The World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org), with assistance from 
the Harvard Institute for International Development, issues an annual Global 
Competitiveness Report. Based on standard economic data and a survey of about 3,000 
business executives, it evaluates 155 separate criteria in 53 countries. The survey includes 
items on bribery and corruption, tax evasion, and the reliability of the judicial system. 
Although the report has been issued annually since 1980, the current methodology dates 
only to 1996.  
 
 The Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch) produces a similar 
competitiveness index for its annual World Competitiveness Yearbook. Ratings are based 
on a survey of several thousand businesspeople around the world. For the 1996 yearbook 
3,162 businesspeople responded to a 72-question survey sent to 21,000 national and 
expatriate businesspeople. Respondents include  both local and international companies, 
reportedly representing a cross-section of the economy in each country. The World 
Competitiveness Yearbook evaluates 46 countries, including all OECD members and 18 
other countries chosen on the basis of their economic importance and the availability of 
data. Hard data are used to supplement the survey, with about 260 total criteria rated. The 
survey queries respondents about relations between managers and employees, employees’ 
identification with company objectives, managers’ sense of social responsibility, 
confidence in the administration of justice, security of persons and property, government 
transparency, the adequacy of the legal framework and bureaucracy in the public sector, 
protection of intellectual property rights, the frequency of tax evasion, and the occurrence 
of improper practices, such as bribing or corruption. 
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
Transparency International (www.transparency.org) constructs a ―corruption perceptions 
index‖ based on ratings by ICRG; the World Competitiveness Yearbook; the Global 
Competitiveness Report; Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder’s (1997) credibility of rules 
index; World Bank–sponsored surveys; and other sources. Each source is weighted 
equally, an a scale of 0–10. 
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The index is produced annually, with country coverage varying as available data 
sources change. Countries are rated only if data are available from at least 3 of the 12 
sources used. Eighty-five countries were rated in 1998. Like the competitiveness ratings, 
Transparency International’s index postdates the cross-country data on economic 
performance, limiting their usefulness in studying the determinants of investment and 
growth.  
 
World Values Surveys 
 
The World Values Survey, organized by Ronald Inglehart with collaborators from around 
the world, have been conducted in 68 countries. The first round of surveys, conducted in 
1981, included 24 countries, most of them advanced industrial economies. A second 
round, conducted in 1990–91, added 21 new countries, most of them formerly socialist 
economies and middle-income developing countries. A third round, conducted in 1995–
96, covered 42 countries, including more than 20 not represented in either of the first two 
rounds. About half of the countries added in this round were formerly socialist 
economies, the other half developing countries. A planned fourth round will add several 
developing countries. (See http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.html for more detailed 
information.) 
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